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Abstract: 
A large body of theoretical and experimental literature suggests that exogenously imposed 
infinite repetition can mitigate people’s opportunistic behavior in dilemma situations through 
personal enforcement. But, do people collectively choose to interact with the same persons, when 
there is an alternative with random matching? In a framework of an indefinitely-repeated 
collective action dilemma game, we let subjects collectively choose whether to (i) play with 
specific others for all rounds or to (ii) play with randomly matched counterparts in every period. 
The experiment showed that most subjects collectively select the partner matching option. It also 
indicated that groups achieve a higher level of cooperation when subjects collectively select 
option (i) by voting, compared with when the same option is exogenously imposed. These 
findings have an implication that people’s equilibrium selection may be affected by how the 
basic rules of games are introduced (endogenously or exogenously) to them. 
JEL classification: C92, H41, C73, D72 
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1.  Introduction 
Collective action dilemmas, where free riding is a strictly dominant strategy but mutual 
contributions leads to a Pareto optimum, are ubiquitous in our real world. A rich body of 
theoretical and experimental studies has put considerable efforts into exploring how to overcome 
people’s opportunistic behavior in such dilemma situations. One of the most established 
behavioral findings in recent decades is that people contribute to public goods to some degree 
even in one-shot games or in earlier rounds of repeated dilemma games (e.g., Ledyard 1995, 
Chaudhuri 2011). However, it has also been shown that people cannot cooperate with each other 
to a high degree without an institution that facilitates their cooperation, such as peer-to-peer 
monetary or non-monetary punishment opportunities (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000, Masclet, 
Noussair, Tucker and Villeval 2008), because of serious tensions between cooperation and non-
cooperation in dilemma situations.  
One important finding from research on dilemmas is that people’s decision to cooperate 
can be significantly altered if the games involve infinite repetition (the possibility to repeatedly 
interact with the same players until an unknown time period). Theoretically, mutual cooperation, 
in addition to mutual defection, holds as an equilibrium outcome with partner matching through 
personal enforcement if the agent is sufficiently patient. Experimental tests for the theory of 
infinitely-repeated games can be conducted using indefinitely-repeated setups with a random 
continuation rule (Roth and Murnighan 1978). The evolution of cooperation has been often 
tested by using prisoner’s dilemma games in the past studies. The experimental literature shows 
that when the partner matching is used, indefinite repetition indeed encourages people to behave 
more cooperatively under some conditions, compared with the environments where players know 
the precise length of the repeated games in which case mutual defection is the unique 
equilibrium (e.g., Roth and Murnighan 1978, Murnighan and Roth 1983, Feinberg and Husted 
1993, Dal Bó, 2005, Duffy and Ochs 2009, Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011).
2
 However, not everyone 
chooses to cooperate in many cases even with indefinite repetition. For instance, in Dal Bó 
(2005), the average cooperation rates range from 20% to 50% in almost all treatments even when 
prisoner’s dilemma games are indefinitely repeated. In Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011), cooperation 
                                                          
2
 See Dal Bó and Fréchette (forthcoming) for a survey of the literature. There are also some other experiments that 
showed that indefinite repetition did not increase the level of cooperation, compared with finite-repeated 
environments (e.g., Lugovskyy et al. 2015). 
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does not evolve even with experiences if mutual cooperation situation is only sub-game perfect 
but a cooperative action is not risk-dominant. Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) further show that 
cooperation does not always evolve, even if cooperation is an equilibrium action and it is also a 
risk-dominant action.  
Even when we assume that people interact with different players from round to round, it 
is theoretically shown that, with infinite repetition, community enforcement can sustain 
cooperation under some conditions (e.g., Kandori 1992, Ellison 1994). Recent experimental 
literature in this area also shows that indefinite repetition may encourage people to cooperate 
even if no information regarding their interaction partners’ past action choices is available. 
However, experimental results with random matching are rather mixed and not established: 
while some studies found positive impact of indefinite repetition even when subjects are not 
provided any information on randomly-matched partners (e.g., Camera and Casari 2009), other 
studies found no impact (e.g., Duffy and Ochs 2009, the N treatment in Kamei forthcoming b).
3
 
One possible channel that may boost cooperation with partner matching is a democratic 
decision-making process where players themselves collectively select the matching protocol.  But 
do people collectively choose to play with the same players, when there is an alternative with 
random matching? How does such collective decision-making affect people’s cooperation 
behavior (equilibrium selection) if people implement the partner matching? As discussed earlier, 
the past studies have shown that not everyone chooses to cooperate with specific others even 
with indefinite repetition. These two equally-important research questions have not been studied 
in the literature.  
Examples where people collectively decide whether to play with each other indefinitely 
are abundant in our real life, especially for small-group interactions. Imagine, for example, 
charitable or voluntary groups that are formed to help the poor in a community. They sometimes 
collectively decide to work together for an indefinite amount of time, instead of meeting 
randomly and creating groups that consist of different members each time. Other examples 
include student groups that act for purposes such as environment protection, sports and political 
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 There are also conflicting results from past studies for the impact of indefinite repetition on the evolution of 
cooperation when some information on interaction partners is disclosed. While Camera and Casari (2009), Stahl 
(2013) and Kamei (forthcoming b) found that cooperation evolved with reputational information, Duffy and Ochs 
(2009) found that it did not. 
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activities. Do people prefer to work with specific peers, instead of engaging in activities where 
they meet their peers randomly and form groups? Does such a collectively-made decision to 
interact with each other for an indefinite length of time affect people’s level of cooperation in 
dilemma situations? For another example, consider international organizations, such as the 
United Nation. These organizations are formed by countries that share the vision of the 
organizations (e.g., poverty alleviation) and the member countries carry out missions together to 
achieve the common goals. The member countries do not usually change very often. The 
alternative would be for countries with common concerns to reach out each other and act 
together to combat an issue. The partner countries may or may not be the same every time a 
country engages in such a project.  
This paper experimentally studies people’s collective choice between two different 
matching protocols under the shadow of the future and the impact of the democratic decision-
making on their cooperation behavior with partner matching in a framework of a linear public 
goods game (also known as voluntary contribution mechanism). In groups of four, each subject 
is given a fixed endowment and decides simultaneously how much to contribute to their group in 
every period. We design two treatments: one for the control condition and the other for the 
treatment condition. The two treatments are identical, except for the implementation process of 
the matching protocols between subjects. In the control condition, subjects play the public good 
game indefinitely with three fixed individuals without any agreement procedures. By contrast, in 
the treatment condition, subjects are randomly assigned to groups with three individuals at the 
onset, and then each group collectively decides whether they want to play the public goods game 
with each other (i) for all rounds subject to a random continuation or (ii) for one round only. The 
collective decisions are made by unanimity rule. Subjects repeat voting until they reach an 
agreement. Agreement procedures in small-group interactions mentioned in the above examples 
often take a form of unanimity rule. Unanimity rule is also employed, for example, not only by 
international organizations, such as the United Nation, but also by political unions, such as the 
European Union. Some past experimental studies have modeled democratic decision-making 
processes by using unanimity rule, including Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010). (As will be 
explained in Section 5, we also conducted an additional treatment with majority rule as the 
democratic decision-making procedure for a robustness check because majority rule is another 
widely used form of democratic decision-making.)   Option (i) is a standard partner matching 
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regime. By contrast, option (ii) is a standard random matching regime. That is, if a group selects 
option (ii), the group is dissolved after the one-time interaction. In the following round, subjects 
will be randomly re-matched with three individuals from groups that selected option (ii), and 
play the one-shot public goods game. This process – dissolution, random matching and one-shot 
public goods game – continues with a fixed probability (the random continuation rule). 
Experimental parameters are set so that (a) contributing nothing for the group is a strictly 
dominant strategy if the stage game is played just once but (b) if the stage game is infinitely 
repeated it becomes a coordination game where any symmetric, positive contribution situation is 
one of the equilibria, regardless of which option (i) or (ii) a group selects. While the mechanism 
with which symmetric, positive-contribution equilibria hold is the personal enforcement under 
option (i), it is the community enforcement under option (ii). In order to perform additional 
analyses as to how subjects’ beliefs are affected by the presence of the voting procedure, we 
elicit subjects’ beliefs on their interaction peers’ average contribution in the indefinitely-repeated 
game just before moving on to the sequence of allocation stages in each treatment. 
A theoretical analysis suggests that the subjects’ average contribution amounts would be 
higher with option (i) than with option (ii), because the threshold continuation probability that 
makes any symmetric positive-contribution situations materially beneficial, relative to free riding 
on their peers’ cooperation, is lower with option (i) than with option (ii). As for subjects’ 
collective choices, past research suggests that subjects may be more likely to vote for option (i), 
rather than option (ii), because of four particular reasons. First, collectively selecting to play with 
specific others may serve as a signal that members will cooperate with other group members in 
the supergame (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006). Second, voting in favor of playing together in a given 
infinitely-repeated game may also serve as an opportunity to indirectly persuade those who 
initially did not plan to cooperate, as is similar to the logic of persuasion through cheap talk, or 
coordination via pre-play communication in coordination games (e.g., Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe 
and Ross 1992, Blume and Ortmann 2007).  Third, according to recent literature on sacrifice, 
some people prefer to reduce their temptation to free ride when given a chance to do so (e.g., 
Aimone, Iannaccone and Makowsky 2013, Grimm and Mengel 2009). In our setup, the 
temptation to free ride is higher with option (ii) than with option (i) because the “hit-and-run” 
strategy (i.e., defect and then escape from the current group members) is possible with the 
random-matching option. Fourth, the democratic decision-making process itself (excluding any 
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instrumental effects it may have, such as selection bias and the effects of information) may also 
help enhance cooperation (e.g., Dal Bó, Forster and Putterman 2010, Kamei 2016a, Sutter, 
Haigner, Kocher 2010, Tyran and Feld 2006). The so-called “democracy premium” may make 
option (i) more attractive to subjects.  
Our experiment reveals that, first, almost all groups choose to interact with three pre-
assigned individuals for all rounds in the treatment condition. Second, subjects contribute 
significantly more in this condition, compared with subjects in the control condition where the 
same rule is exogenously assigned to them. A detailed analysis suggests that the difference in the 
subjects’ contribution behavior between the treatment and control conditions is not due to 
selection effects (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006, Dal Bó, Forster and Putterman 2010, Dal Bó, 
Forster and Kamei 2015) but can be explained by higher beliefs formed by subjects in the 
treatment condition, as in the signaling hypothesis (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006). This implies that 
democratic decision-making may significantly affect subjects’ equilibrium selection in an 
infinitely-repeated collective action dilemma by influencing their beliefs. 
In order to check the robustness of the findings summarized above, we also conducted an 
additional treatment by changing the unanimity rule to majority rule, while keeping all of the 
other design pieces of the original endogenous treatment the same. The additional data with 
majority voting replicates qualitatively almost the same results as in the original treatments. This 
implies that our results may not depend on which voting rules are used in democratic decision-
making. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design. 
Section 3 briefly provides theoretical considerations. Section 4 reports results, and Section 5 
summarizes results from the additional treatment. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Experimental Design 
The design frame of our study is an indefinitely-repeated public goods game. Group size 
is four. We let subjects play the indefinitely-repeated game five times in both of the two 
treatments.
4
 The repeated supergame design was chosen, instead of a one-shot supergame design, 
in order to explore how people’s collective choices change from supergame to supergame and 
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 The term “phase” was used in the experiment to refer to indefinitely-repeated game. 
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how the impact of democratic decision-making persists over time. We employ a standard 
stranger matching protocol for matching across the supergames. That is, at the onset of each 
supergame, group compositions are randomly changed. The duration of each supergame is 
stochastically determined. We set the random continuation probability as 75%: subjects in the t
th
 
round of a given supergame will have the next round (i.e., round t + 1) with a probability of 75% 
(the supergame ends with a probability of 25%). Therefore, the expected length of subjects’ 
interactions is 4 (= 1/(1 – .75)) rounds in each supergame. This feature of stochastic 
determination of the game duration is common knowledge in the experiment.  
The experiment consists of an endogenous treatment and an exogenous treatment (Table 
1).  We adopt a between-subjects design. The reason that we employ the between-subjects design, 
instead of a within-subjects design, is that democratic decision-making may affect subjects’ 
behavior beyond the environment where subjects make decisions. This indirect effect of 
democratic decision-making is defined as the spill-over effect of democracy in Kamei (2016a). 
In other words, we would obtain cleaner data if we divide subjects into the treatment groups and 
the control groups and then let them play the game under only one condition than otherwise. 
This paper’s empirical strategies to identify the impact of democratic decision-making 
are as follows:  
Strategy a: to compare subjects’ action choices in the 1st supergame between the two treatments 
but use the rounds that occurred in all sessions of the 1
st
 supergame. 
Strategy b: to compare subjects’ action choices in all supergames between the two treatments 
but use the rounds that occurred in all sessions.  
The strategies to compare subjects’ behaviors in the same number of rounds between the two 
treatments is employed because each supergame likely has different length by session due to the 
random continuation rule and would not be comparable between sessions (and accordingly 
between the two treatments) if we use every data. With strategies a and b, we most likely use the 
first round of each supergame to study the democracy effects. Because we use the continuation 
probability of 75%, the probability that at least two rounds occur in all sessions of both of the 
two treatments is: (.75)
K
  100[%], where K is the number of sessions. As will be explained in 
Section 4, there are three sessions per treatment. Thus, K = 6. In other words, the probability that 
at least two rounds are realized in all the six sessions is very low – only 17.8% (= (.75)6  100). 
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We perform analyses using strategy a, in addition to using strategy b, because data in the first 
supergame is cleaner than that of the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergames because subjects’ experiences in the 
first supergame would differ by session due to the random continuation rule. The difference in 
subjects’ experience in earlier supergames may affect their contribution and voting behavior in 
the later supergames. We now explain each design piece one by one. 
2.1. The Stage Game 
 The stage game used in the two treatments is a public goods game. In every round, each 
subject is given an endowment of 20 points, and they simultaneously decide how much to 
allocate to their private and public accounts. The contribution amount must be an integer 
between 0 and 20. The sum of allocations to the private account and the public account must be 
20 points. The payoff consequence follows the standard linear public goods game. That is, for 
each point that a subject allocates to her private account, she obtains one point as her payoff 
without affecting the payoffs of her group members. For each point she allocates to her public 
account, she and her three partners each obtain Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) = .4 points 
as payoffs. In summary, when subject i contributes Ci,t to the public account in round t, she 
obtains the following payoff: 
 20 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑟 ∑ 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 , (1) 
where r = .4 and N = 4 in this study. Note that 1/N < r < 1. 
2.2. The Treatment Condition 
 In the endogenous treatment, which we call the “ENDO” treatment, after subjects are 
randomly assigned to a group of four in each supergame, they collectively decide the duration of 
interactions by voting for that supergame. The voting option is either “all rounds in a given 
supergame” (“all rounds”, hereafter) or “one round.”5 We can interpret this collective choice as a 
choice between continuation probabilities of .75 and .00. The collective decision is made by 
unanimity rule. In this collective-decision stage, four members of a group continue to vote until 
all votes for the same option. The maximum number of the voting stages is 20.
6
 In case where 
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 The two options were called “all periods in a given phase” and “one period” in the experiment. 
6
 The maximum number of voting stages is set in order to avoid the duration of the experiment being too long.  
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four members do not agree on one option in the 20
th
 voting stage, majority rule is applied to 
determine the group’s choice.7 
If a group selects the “all rounds” option, then the four subjects interact with each other 
until the end of a given supergame. By contrast, if the group selects the “one round” option, their 
interaction is one-shot. Groups that selected the option of “one round” are dissolved after the 
one-shot interaction. They are then randomly assigned to new groups of four among them and 
play the game with the three new peers once. The process of dissolution, re-matching and one-
shot public goods game repeats with a continuation probability of 75%.
8
  
2.3. The Control Condition 
In the exogenous treatment, which we call the “EXO” treatment, there is no opportunity 
for subjects to collectively decide the duration of interactions. Instead, subjects are instructed 
that they will play with three pre-assigned members for the entire rounds in a given supergame.
9
   
2.4. Elicitation of Beliefs 
 We elicit subjects’ beliefs in order to examine what influences their decisions to 
contribute as an additional analysis. Specifically, in the ENDO treatment, after the voting stage 
and before moving on to the sequence of allocation stages, regardless of vote outcomes, subjects 
are asked about beliefs on the average contribution amount to the public account by their 
interaction peers during a given supergame. Likewise, subjects in the EXO treatment are also 
asked to state their beliefs on their interaction peers’ average contribution amount at the onset of 
each supergame.  
                                                          
7
 When votes are split equally between the two options in the 20th vote, one of them is randomly (i.e., with a 
probability of 50%) selected by the computer.  
8
 If the number of groups that chose the option of “one round” is only one, then the group members interact with 
each other for all rounds in the given supergame because there are no other groups to be dissolved. Subjects are not 
informed how many groups selected the “one round” option. 
9
 We acknowledge that there are other ways to design the control treatment. For instance, another possible way to 
design the control treatment would be to assign each option stochastically to control groups with the actual 
percentages of groups which select each option in the ENDO treatment, without informing subjects of the 
percentages of stochastic implementation. We did not employ this method because subjects in the ENDO treatment 
were able to guess the likelihood of implementation of an option to some degree as subjects’ votes determine 
collective choices. Alternatively, we could stochastically impose one of the two options on control groups while 
notifying subjects the percentages of stochastic determination. However, this control treatment design is not perfect 
either as subjects in the ENDO treatment are not given the information on how many groups select the “all rounds” 
or “one round” option. 
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We note that the belief elicitation task is not incentivized in order to minimize its effects 
on subjects’ action choices because this paper’s focus is on subjects’ voting and their actual 
contribution behaviors.
10
 Possible effects of incentivized belief elicitation have been documented 
(see, for example, Gächter and Renner 2010 for the detail).
11
  
3. Theoretical Considerations and Discussions 
 The standard theory does not provide a point prediction in our setting. In the EXO 
treatment, not only the mutual free-riding but also any symmetric, positive contribution situation 
holds as an equilibrium outcome since we adopt 0.75 as a continuation probability. To illustrate a 
possibility of the mutual full contribution equilibrium in this control treatment, suppose that all 
four individuals in a group have contributed their full endowment amounts (E) to the public 
account before round t and have been and will be following a grim trigger strategy. That is, a 
subject i contributes E points until she sees at least one instance of defection where one of the 
individuals in her group contributes less than E; once i faces the defection she starts contributing 
0 points until the end of a given supergame. In this situation, if subject i continues to follow the 
grim trigger strategy in and after round t, her expected payoff (𝐸[𝜋𝑖]) is calculated as: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = ∑ 𝛿𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑠(𝑐𝑖,𝑠)
∞
𝑠=𝑡 =
𝑟∙𝑁∙𝐸
1−𝛿
= 128, (2) 
where E = 20, r is the MPCR (= .4), N is group size (= 4) and 𝛿 is the continuation probability 
(= .75). Alternatively, if she changes her strategy and contributes 0 points in round t, her 
expected payoff is maximized by also contributing 0 points in any rounds after round t because 
the other three players will not cooperate as they are following the grim trigger strategy. The 
maximum payoff is thus calculated as: 
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝐸 − 0 + 𝑟 ∙ (𝑁 − 1) ∙ 𝐸 + ∑ 𝛿𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑠(𝑐𝑖,𝑠)
∞
𝑠=𝑡+1 = 44 +
𝛿∙𝐸
1−𝛿
= 104, (3) 
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 See Sections (c) and (d) in Appendix A for computer screen images for this elicitation task. 
11
 Gächter and Renner (2010) let subjects play ten-period finitely-repeated linear public goods game with the same 
experimental parameters as this paper (the per-subject endowment is 20 points and the MPCR (r) is .4). Their results 
indicated that elicited beliefs were more accurate when they were incentivized than when they were not incentivized 
(although the mean difference was only 0.59 points), but the incentivized elicitation significantly affected subjects’ 
contribution amounts. If subjects’ beliefs were not incentivized, by contrast, their contribution amounts were not 
significantly different from those in a treatment where beliefs were not elicited. Gächter and Renner (2010) suggest 
that “If the researcher is afraid that belief elicitation leads to behavioral results that he or she would not obtain when 
not asking for beliefs, then […] belief elicitation should not be incentivized” (page 372). 
11 
 
which is less than the mutual full contribution payoff in Eq. (2). It is therefore not materially 
beneficial for i to deviate from the mutual full contribution situation. Note that the threshold 
value of δ so that the mutual full contribution situation can be supported as an equilibrium 
outcome is 0.5, which is much less than .75.  
 There also exist a symmetric, positive, but less-than-full-contribution equilibrium for any 
contribution level ξ ∊ {1, 2, …, E} in the EXO treatment. The existence of such equilibria can be 
checked with the same logic that assumes the subjects’ grim trigger strategy. With the symmetric 
contribution equilibrium with the contribution level of ξ points, subject i obtains a payoff as in 
Eq. (4): 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝜉 points = ∑ 𝛿𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑠(𝜉)
∞
𝑠=𝑡 =
𝐸−𝜉+𝑟∙𝑁∙𝜉
1−𝛿
. (4) 
If subject i, by contrast, contributes 0 points to the public account in a given period, she obtains 
the following as maximum payoff: 
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝐸 − 0 + 𝑟 ∙ (𝑁 − 1) ∙ 𝜉 + ∑ 𝛿𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑠(0)
∞
𝑠=𝑡+1 . 
 = 𝐸 + 𝑟 ∙ (𝑁 − 1)𝜉 +
𝛿𝐸
1−𝛿
. (5) 
Eqs. (4) and (5) suggest that 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝜉 points > 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡, regardless of the 
value of 𝜉, if δ is greater than 0.5. We also see that Eq. (4) is monotonically increasing in the 
mutual contribution level ξ. In other words, the strategic situation that subjects face is the one 
with Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria. 
The same holds true also for groups that select the “all rounds” option in the ENDO 
treatment. These groups face the same strategic situation with Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria. 
OBSERVATION 1: Not only the mutual full free-riding situation, but also any symmetric, 
positive contribution situation holds as an equilibrium outcome in the EXO treatment. The 
subjects in groups where the “all rounds” option is collectively implemented in the ENDO 
treatment face the same strategic situation as subjects in the EXO treatment.  
 Subjects have stronger incentives to defect in groups where the “one round” option is 
implemented because they can hit and run considering that the groups will be dissolved after a 
given round and they may be matched with subjects from other groups in the following rounds. 
12 
 
However, one instance of defection spreads very quickly to other subjects in groups with the 
“one round” option, as in the logic of Kandori (1992), if we assume that each subject employs a 
grim trigger strategy. Because of this contagion process, a symmetric, positive contribution 
situation with any level ξ ∊ {1, 2, …, E}, including the mutual full contribution situation, holds 
as an equilibrium outcome. Incentives to defect depend on how many groups select the “one 
round” option. For an extreme example, suppose that there are 24 subjects in the experiment and 
all of the groups (six groups) selected the “one round” option. As will be explained later, the 
number of groups per session was either five or six in the experiment. Because the incentive to 
defect is largest in this extreme situation, if symmetric positive contribution situations are 
supported as an equilibrium outcome in this situation, there is also no incentive for subject i to 
deviate from the grim trigger strategy when the number of groups that selected the “one round” 
option is less than six. As calculated in Appendix B, even in this extreme situation, when subject 
i contributes less than ξ points in round t, the percentages of full free-riders out of the other 23 
subjects becomes around 90% by round t + 3 even if the 23 subjects have contributed ξ points 
until round t. Due to the rapid contagion of free-riding, the total expected payoff from the 
defection is lower than the mutual cooperation payoff, which is (E – ξ + r∙N∙ξ)/(1 – δ). This 
means that there is no incentive for i to deviate and thus any symmetric contribution situation 
holds as an equilibrium outcome. These considerations are summarized as in the following 
observation: 
OBSERVATION 2: Regardless of how many groups select the “one round” option, both mutual 
full free-riding situation and any symmetric, positive contribution situation (including the mutual 
full contribution situation) hold as equilibria when the “one round” option is collectively 
implemented in a given supergame.  
 Despite Observations 1 and 2, a symmetric contribution equilibrium for a given 
contribution level (ξ points) would be more easily attained when the “all rounds” option is 
collectively selected. This is because the threshold value of continuation probabilities with the 
“one round” option that support mutual contribution as an equilibrium outcome (𝛿̅𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) is 
higher than or equal to that with the “all rounds” option (𝛿̅𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 = .5). As discussed, group 
composition changes in every period among those who selected the “one round” option. 
𝛿̅𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 would coincide with 𝛿̅𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 if only one group selects the “one round” option and 
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the members of this specific group is aware of the fact that they are the only group that selected 
the “one round” option, which is less likely to be the case; but the former is always larger than 
the latter in any other situations. This means that subjects’ incentives to deviate are smaller when 
the “all rounds” option is selected than when the “one round” option is selected. We can 
therefore summarize the difference in subjects’ contribution behavior as in OBSERVATION 3: 
OBSERVATION 3: Any given symmetric contribution situation is more easily attained when the 
“all rounds” option is collectively selected than when the “one round” option is selected. 
 OBSERVATION 3 suggests that the average contribution in groups that select the “all 
rounds” option would be higher than that in groups that select the “one round” option. This leads 
to the following first specific hypothesis in our study. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Groups who select the “all rounds” option make a significantly higher level of 
contributions than groups who select the “one round” option. 
 Then, which option do groups collectively select? There are two factors in particular that 
may encourage subjects to vote for the “all rounds” option in our context. First, a subject’s vote 
in favor of the “all rounds” option can serve as a signal that she intends to contribute large 
amounts in a given supergame because of Hypothesis 1 (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006). Past 
experimental studies have demonstrated the significant impact that a coordination device has on 
equilibrium selection in coordination games (e.g., Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross 1992, 
Blume and Ortmann 2007). For instance, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1992) shows that 
in a one-shot two-person coordination game where one equilibrium is Pareto optimal, two-way 
pre-play communication (in that subjects can send a message as to which action they choose) 
helps subjects choose the Pareto-dominant Nash Equilibrium. As the two-way signaling channel 
facilitated by the democratic decision process can act as a coordination device, subjects in the 
ENDO treatment may believe that others would contribute significantly higher amounts if the 
“all rounds” option is collectively selected, compared with subjects in the EXO treatment.12 
Second, voting for the “all rounds” option means that the subject prefers to sacrifice the high 
temptation to deviate under the “one round” option. Recent experimental research suggests that 
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 The importance of beliefs when subjects choose actions has also been proposed and experimentally demonstrated 
in finitely-repeated setups (e.g., Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson 1982, Selten and Stoecker 1986, Andreoni and 
Miller 1993, Kamei and Putterman 2017, Kamei 2016b). 
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some subjects prefer to reduce temptation to defect given an opportunity to do so in dilemma 
situations. For instance, Aimone, Iannaccone and Makowsky (2013) give subjects an opportunity 
to reduce returns from private account in a public goods game on condition that (a) mutual free-
riding remains to be the unique Nash equilibrium of the material payoff and (b) those who select 
a similar level of sacrifice for private returns are matched with each other by a sorting 
mechanism. Their study found that around half of subjects prefer to reduce the temptation to free 
ride and cooperate with like-minded others at a high level although the amount of temptation to 
reduce differs by subject.
13
 In our study, not only mutual full free-riding but also any symmetric 
contribution situation holds as an equilibrium outcome under both of the two options 
(Observations 1 and 2). Although subjects in our study also do not have self-sorting 
opportunities, the findings of research such as Aimone, Iannaccone and Makowsky (2013) may 
extend to our setups where there are multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. These past experimental 
studies lead to the following specific hypothesis in our study: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Most groups select the “all rounds” option in the ENDO treatment. 
Subjects’ contribution behavior under the “all rounds” option may differ between the 
ENDO and EXO treatments. First, as already discussed, democratic decision-making provides an 
opportunity for subjects to send signals of their future contribution behavior (e.g. Tyran and Feld 
2006). For instance, Tyran and Feld (2006), using a one-shot linear public goods game with 
group size of three and a non-deterrent sanction law, showed that the more supporters of the non-
deterrent sanction there are in a group, the higher amounts subjects contribute to the public 
good.
14
 Further, they found that subjects’ contribution amounts and their expectations of peers’ 
contribution amounts are positively correlated when the non-deterrent sanction law has been 
imposed. Second, there may also exist the democracy premium – which is a residual effect of the 
democratic decision process seen even after controlling for selection bias and the effects of 
information through voting. In other words, the democracy premium is the effect that democratic 
decision-making directly has on people’s behavior (Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman 2010, Kamei 
2016a, Markussen, Putterman and Tyran 2014, Sutter, Haigner, Kocher 2010, Tyran and Feld 
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 See Grimm and Mengel (2009) and Frédéric and Weber (2013) also. 
14
 Tyran and Feld (2006) used a strategy method in that each subject was asked to indicate how many points to 
contribute to the public good on condition that the numbers of supporters are 0, 1, and 2. 
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2006).
15
 Subjects may have a higher willingness to cooperate due to the democracy premium, 
compared with subjects in the EXO treatment.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: (a) Subjects who select the “all rounds” option in the ENDO treatment 
contribute significantly larger amounts than subjects in the EXO treatment. (b) Beliefs formed by 
subjects who select the “all rounds” option in the ENDO treatment are significantly higher than 
those in the EXO treatment, as is consistent with the signaling hypothesis. (c)  There is some 
positive effect from democratic decision-making on enhancing cooperation even after controlling 
for the difference in subjects’ beliefs between the two treatments. 
 Hypothesis 3(a) is related to one of the main questions of this paper, whereas Hypotheses 
3(b) and (c) explain what may drive Hypothesis 3(a). Hypotheses 3(b) and (c) can be studied 
using the beliefs elicited from subjects in the experiment. 
4. Results 
 The experimental sessions were conducted at the Centre for Experimental Economics 
(EXEC) laboratory at the University of York in the United Kingdom from October to December 
2015. All subjects were students at the University of York. In total, six sessions – three for each 
treatment, were conducted. Each session consisted of five or six groups. Subjects voluntarily 
registered for and participated in the experiment. They were recruited by solicitation messages 
sent through HRoot (Bock, Nicklisch, and Baetge 2014). No subject participated in more than 
one session. Client computers were separated from each other by three sufficiently tall partitions 
(one for the front and two for the sides). No communication was permitted throughout the entire 
experiment. 
All experimental procedures except the instructions and comprehension questions were 
computerized. They were programmed in ztree (Fischbacher 2007). All instructions were 
neutrally framed (see Appendix A). Any words with positive or negative connotation (e.g., 
contribute, public goods) were avoided. At the onset of the experiment, the instructions were 
handed out to subjects and were read aloud by the experimenter. Then, subjects were asked to 
                                                          
15
 We note that the presence of the democracy premium may depend on the distribution of income. All of the papers 
cited here used experimental setups where endowments were the same among subjects. By contrast, the democracy 
premium was not observed in Kamei (forthcoming a), where subjects collectively selected a public goods game or a 
lottery contest when endowments were unequally distributed among the subjects.  
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answer comprehension questions to check their understanding of the experiment. At the end of 
the experiment, each subject was privately paid based on their interaction outcomes. The average 
per-subject payoff (including £3 for participation fee) was 14.70 pounds sterling. 
4.1. Subjects’ Voting Behavior 
 We first look at subjects’ vote outcomes to address our first research question (people’s 
collective choice). First, as consistent with Hypothesis 2, our experiment shows that most groups 
collectively prefer having the “all rounds” option in the ENDO treatment from the first 
supergame (Table 1). Specifically, 15 out of 16 groups chose to play with the same players for 
all rounds in the first supergame. The percentages of groups that chose this option stayed similar 
during the five supergames, except the 3
rd
 supergame where the percentage was slightly lower. 
 Second, although we found the overwhelming support for the “all rounds” option, the 
number of voting stages required for groups to agree on one of the two options differed 
substantially by group and session (Appendix Table C.1). While around 55% of group choices 
were unanimously agreed in the first or second voting stage, 36% of group decisions required at 
least five voting stages.   
RESULT 1: (i) Hypothesis 2 holds. Most groups implemented the “all rounds” option in each 
supergame. (ii) Nevertheless, the number of votes required to agree on one option substantially 
differed by group. 
4.2. The Impact of Democratic Decision-Making 
We next move on to identifying the impact of democratic decision-making on subjects’ 
contribution behaviors.
16
 We usually need to take care of selection effects for this purpose (e.g. 
Tyran and Feld 2006, Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman 2010, Kamei 2016a, Dal Bó, Foster and 
Kamei 2015). However, the collective preference exhibited by almost all groups to commit to a 
longer partnership from the 1
st
 supergame (RESULT 1) means that the voting process does not 
create a subsample that is not representative of the population in the ENDO treatment. Therefore, 
there are little concerns of selection bias when we compare subjects’ action choices under the 
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 Because average payoffs are the linear transformations of subjects’ contribution amounts based on Eq. (1), results 
are the same even if the data of their payoffs is instead used.  
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“all rounds” option in the ENDO treatment against those in the EXO treatment, although we 
conducted some robustness checks nevertheless, as explained later in this subsection.
17
 By 
contrast, when identifying the effects of democratic decision-making, it may be desirable to 
control for a possibility of correlation. This is because the duration of voting stages differed by 
experimental session (Section 4.1). This means that subjects’ action choices may be correlated 
within sessions. For this reason, standard errors are clustered by the session level when 
individual-level data is used for analyses. 
 We identify the impact of democratic decision-making by using empirical strategies (a) 
and (b) as discussed in Section 2. As expected, in each supergame, only the first round is the 
common period that occurred in the six sessions (see Section 2.1).
18
 Thus, we use round 1 
behaviors in each supergame to investigate possible democracy effects. 
Table 2 provides the average round 1 contribution amounts by treatment and supergame. 
The average contribution is 10.97 points in the 1
st
 supergame in the ENDO treatment when the 
groups selected the “all rounds” option, which is greater than that in the EXO treatment (9.19 
points). The large difference in the average contribution amount between the two treatments 
persists until the 5
th
 supergame.  In order to study the significance of the impact of democratic 
decision-making, we conducted regression analyses (Table 3). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 
includes estimation results using data of the 1
st
 supergame only (1
st
 SG data, hereafter) and of all 
the five supergames (All SG data, hereafter), respectively. The dependent variable is subject i’s 
contribution amount to the public account in both columns. As for the data of the ENDO 
treatment, only observations in groups which selected the “all rounds” option are used. The 
independent variables include the Endo dummy variable, which equals 1 for the ENDO 
treatment; and 0 otherwise. A tobit regression model is used for the estimation because subjects’ 
contribution amounts are censored at 0 and 20.
19
 Standard errors are clustered by session for both 
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 We note that taking care of selection bias is required if a selection through voting occurs unlike our result. See Dal 
Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) and Tyran and Feld (2006). Also see Dal Bó, Foster and Kamei (2015), which 
recently propose a new identification strategy for correcting selection bias in measuring the impact of a democratic 
process in case of majority rule.  
18
 The trends of subjects’ round-by-round action choices by session are provided in Appendix Figure C.1. As we had 
anticipated, the realized length of each indefinitely-repeated game differed substantially by session and supergame 
in the experiment as often seen in indefinitely-repeated game experiments. For instance, the 1
st
 supergame lasted for 
only 1 round in three sessions out of six sessions.  
19
 One drawback of using a tobit model is that individual random effects cannot be added on top of session 
clustering. An alternative estimation method to address this concern is to adopt an ordered probit regression model 
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of the 1
st
 SG data and the All SG data.
20
 The specification in column (1) includes only the Endo 
dummy variable as independent variables since we use action choices in the first supergame as 
data. In column (2), by contrast, the supergame number variable (which equals 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) 
and its interaction with the Endo dummy variable are additionally included in order to control for 
the trend across the supergames. Estimation results in both columns (1) and (2) indicate that the 
Endo dummy obtains a significantly positive coefficient for each of the 1
st
 SG and All SG data. 
This suggests that letting subjects collectively choose the “all rounds” option helps enhance 
subjects’ contributions significantly.21   
 Subjects’ contribution amounts were very different between groups that selected the “one 
round” option and ones that selected “all rounds” option. The average contribution amounts of 
the former groups were much lower than those of the latter groups (Table 2). This is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1. We note, however, that we are unable to statistically compare the efficiency 
between the two options because very few groups selected the “one round” option in the ENDO 
treatment (RESULT 1). 
RESULT 2: (i) Hypothesis 3(a) holds. Subjects contributed significantly more when they 
democratically implemented the “all rounds” option, compared with when they were 
exogenously given the same option. This difference remained similar from the first to the last 
supergame. (ii) Hypothesis 1 holds. 
 We note that our results are robust even if we consider a possibility of small selection 
effects. For instance, as discussed with Table 1, one group selected the “one round” option in the 
1
st
 supergame in the ENDO treatment. One may assume that the least cooperative groups may 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
because subjects were asked to select one choice among the ordered set: {0, 1, 2, …, 20} as a contribution amount in 
each round and also because the ordered probit method allows researchers to include both clustering and individual 
random effects. We estimated the same specifications using ordered probit regression models as a robustness check 
while including both session clustering and individual random effects. The results, found in Appendix Table C.2, are 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. As a further robustness check, we also ran a linear regression while 
including both session clustering and individual random effects, which again finds that the results are qualitatively 
similar to results of Table 2 (the results are omitted to conserve space). 
20
 Clustering by session is especially required for the All SG data because the stranger matching protocol is used 
across the supergames. 
21
 Results are similar when session average Mann-Whitney tests are used. The average round 1 contribution in the 1
st
 
supergame in the ENDO treatment when the groups selected the “all rounds” option (10.97 points) is significantly 
higher than that in the EXO treatment (9.19 points) (p = .0495, two-sided). The difference in the average 
contribution amount is also statistically significant between the two treatments when we use average round 1 
contribution amounts across all of the five supergames (p = .0495, two-sided). 
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have selected the “one round” option and thus the effect of democratic decision-making seen in 
Tables 2 and 3 may be overestimated. For a robustness check, we conducted a regression whose 
specification is the same as that in column (1) of Table 3 while excluding one group with the 
lowest contribution amount in the EXO treatment. As shown in Appendix Table C.4, it was 
found that the Endo dummy variable obtains a significantly positive coefficient as in column (1) 
of Table 3. We likewise conducted a robustness check of column (2) of Table 3 as well by 
dropping group(s) with the lowest contribution amount(s) in other supergames of the EXO 
treatment; which found that the Endo dummy still obtains a significant coefficient as in column 
(2) of Table 3 (the results are also included in Appendix Table C.4).  
We also note that as shown in Appendix Table C.1, some groups did not unanimously 
agree on one of the two options even in the last voting stage (i.e., the 20
th
 voting stage). Results 
in Table 3 change little even if we exclude these groups from regressions (see Appendix Table 
C.3 for the estimation results). 
4.3. Subjects’ Beliefs on their Peers’ Action Choices – Signaling Effects 
 A possible factor that may drive RESULT 2 is the effect of signals to cooperate that were 
sent through voting in the ENDO treatment (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006). In order to explore this 
possibility, as an additional analysis we conducted regressions by including subjects’ beliefs on 
their interaction peers’ average contribution amount in a given supergame in regressions 
(columns (3) and (4) of Table 3). Further, the interaction term between the belief variable and the 
Endo dummy variable was included in order to analyze how the correlation between subject’s 
own contribution amounts and beliefs differ by the presence of the democratic decision process. 
The estimation results support Hypothesis 3(b). As shown in column (3) of Table 3, the Endo 
dummy variable no longer obtains a significant coefficient, but instead the belief variable obtains 
a significantly positive coefficient for the 1
st
 SG data. This implies that the driver of the highly 
significant effect of the democratic decision process observed in column (1) was subjects’ more 
optimistic beliefs on their interaction peers’ contribution amounts in the ENDO treatment, 
compared with the EXO treatment. Likewise, the same also holds for the All SG data – see 
column (4) of Table 3.  
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In order to closely check how subjects’ beliefs evolved from supergame to supergame, 
we also examined the trend of subjects’ average beliefs from supergame to supergame (Table 4). 
First, as is consistent with our discussions in Table 3, it indicated that the average belief in the 1
st
 
supergame formed by subjects who selected the “all rounds” option was higher than that formed 
by subjects who were exogenously given the same option in the EXO treatment. The difference 
was significant (see column (1), Table 5). This is suggestive of the idea that the effects of signals 
sent through voting may be large enough to enhance subjects’ level of contributions (e.g., Tyran 
and Feld 2006). Second, however, the average beliefs of subjects who implemented the ”all 
rounds” option in the ENDO treatment declined rapidly from supergame to supergame, and 
settled at a similar level to the EXO treatment in the 3
rd
 to 5
th
 supergames (see Table 4). A 
regression analysis indicates that the average beliefs across all supergames are only weakly 
significantly different between the two treatments when the “all rounds” option is in effect 
(column (2), Table 5).
22
 This rapid decline of beliefs in the ENDO treatment is in contrast with 
subjects’ action choices: subjects’ average contribution amounts did not decline very quickly 
with the democratic decision process (Table 2). These observations on beliefs and action choices 
mean that democratic decision-making itself may have directly affected the subjects contribution 
behavior even after the effects of signals sent through voting diminished in the experiment (e.g., 
Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman 2010, Kamei 2016a), as in Hypothesis 3(c).  
RESULT 3: Beliefs on interaction peers’ contribution amounts formed by subjects who 
collectively selected the “all rounds” option were significantly higher than ones formed by 
subjects who were given the same option in the EXO treatment in the 1
st
 supergame. However, 
the beliefs reach similar levels between the two treatments in the 3
rd
 to 5
th
 supergames unlike the 
contribution dynamics summarized in RESULT 2.  
4.4. The Number of Voting Stages to Reach a Consensus and Subjects’ Decisions to Contribute 
As mentioned earlier, the number of voting stages required to reach a consensus differed 
by group (Appendix Table C.1). How did the differences in the voting length affect subjects’ 
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 This weak significant result is not robust. The Endo dummy variable fails to obtain a significant coefficient if an 
ordered probit regression, instead of the tobit regression model, is used. The average beliefs across all supergames 
are not significantly different between the two treatment also according to Mann-Whitney tests (p-value = .2752, 
two-sided).  
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belief formation and action choices? We explore this sub-question by conducting a regressions 
analysis using the 1
st
 supergame.
23
  
As shown in Appendix Table C.6, we find two interesting results. First, regardless of the 
numbers of voting stages required for groups to reach an agreement, democratic decision-making 
enhances subjects’ beliefs on their interaction peers’ contribution amounts (Panel (2) of Table 
C.6). This implies that voting opportunities are indeed helpful for subjects to signal their future 
intention to cooperate, as shown in Tyran and Feld (2006). Second, however, subjects’ 
contribution behaviors largely depend on the number of voting stages required to reach an 
agreement.  In the ENDO treatment, out of 15 groups that implemented the “all rounds” option, 
the number of groups that underwent one voting stage, two voting stages, three voting stages, 
seven voting stages and 20 voting stages are five, six, two, one and one group(s), respectively.  
As is consistent with RESULT 2, subjects’ contribution amounts were significantly higher in 
groups that underwent small number of voting stages for reaching a consensus, compared with 
groups in the EXO treatment (Panel (1) of Table C.6). However, subjects contributed 
significantly less to the public good when they had to spend all voting stages in order to reach an 
agreement compared with subjects in the EXO treatment. The latter result may mean that the 
democratic decision process alone is not enough to persuade some very uncooperative subjects to 
cooperate even though the “all rounds” option is imposed in the last voting stage.  This result is 
similar to Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) and Kamei (2016a) where majority rules were 
used. In Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) and Kamei (2016a), only supporters of a policy 
exhibit the positive effects of democratic decision-making.
24
 
RESULT 4: Democratic decision-making enhanced subjects’ beliefs, regardless of how many 
voting stages subjects spent for an agreement. Democratic decision-making raised subjects’ 
contributions only in groups that underwent small number of voting stages for getting a 
consensus. 
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 Data of the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame was not included in this analysis in order to avoid the analysis become too 
complicated. In addition to the difference in the number of voting stages in the 1
st
 supergame, subjects’ experiences 
(the number of allocation stages) in earlier supergames also differed by sessions as mentioned earlier, which would 
make the analysis complex.  
24
 In Tyran and Feld (2006), both supporters and opponents of a policy in the endogenous regime raised their level 
of contributions, compared with the exogenous regime. The difference in subjects’ behavior between these past 
studies may be caused by the difference in culture or norms (e.g., the United States versus Switzerland). 
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5. Collective Decision-Making with Majority Rule   
We found that almost all groups prefer to play with specific others, rather than random 
others, even though any symmetric contribution situation holds as an equilibrium outcome in 
both regimes. We also found that democratic selection of interaction durations may enhance 
cooperation, compared with the environment where interaction durations are exogenously given, 
as is similar to past studies on democracy (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006, Dal Bó, Foster and 
Putterman 2010, Kamei 2016a, Sutter, Haigner and Kocher 2010). Some democratic decision-
making takes a form other than unanimity rule, such as majority rule. Would the key results we 
summarized in Section 4 change if a different voting rule is used? Recent experimental work on 
democracy – Tyran and Feld (2006), Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010), and Kamei (2016a), 
used majority rule, rather than unanimity rule, unlike Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010). In 
order to check the robustness of our findings in Section 4, we designed an additional treatment 
by changing the decision rule from the unanimity rule to a majority rule. That is, whichever 
option (“all rounds” or “one round”) receives more than two votes is implemented in a group. 
When the votes are split in half, the computer randomly breaks the tie. We note that unlike the 
ENDO treatment, the duration of the voting stage is one for every group in each session. Thus, 
group-level data could be considered as the unit of independent observations in the 1
st
 supergame. 
We call this additional treatment the “ENDO-Majority” treatment (“Endogenous, Majority Rule” 
treatment). The design pieces other than the collective decision rule are identical to those of the 
ENDO treatment (the instructions of the ENDO-Majority treatment are available in Section D.1 
of Appendix D). 
We conducted three sessions of the ENDO-Majority treatment in October 2016 in the 
EXEC laboratory at the University of York. The experimental procedure, including recruiting 
subjects, is the same as that in the original two treatments. A total of 64 subjects participated in 
the additional treatment. The number of subjects per session was 20 or 24, and they were broken 
into 5 or 6 groups. The average per-subject payoff (including £3 for participation fee) was 16.41 
pounds sterling. The results of this treatment are very similar to those in the ENDO treatment as 
will be explained in this section. 
First, Result 1(i) holds also for the ENDO-Majority treatment. Table 1 reports the number 
of groups that collectively selected the “all rounds” option by supergame. It indicates that 15 out 
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of 16 groups in the ENDO-Majority treatment collectively implemented the “all rounds” option, 
as is the case in the ENDO treatment. After the first supergame, slightly smaller numbers of 
groups, 10 to 13 groups, collectively selected the “all rounds” option in each supergame in this 
treatment. However, the difference in the fraction of groups that selected the “all rounds” option 
between the two endogenous treatments is not significantly different in each supergame (see 
Appendix Table D.1).  
RESULT 5: Result 1(i) holds for the ENDO-Majority treatment. That is, the majority of groups 
selected the “all rounds” option in the ENDO-Majority treatment. 
Second, we find significantly positive impact of democratic decision-making on subjects’ 
contribution behaviors in the ENDO-Majority treatment. We apply empirical strategies (a) and 
(b) for the data of the ENDO-Majority treatment. As expected because of our experimental 
design setting, in each of the five supergames, only the first period is the common period across 
all of the three sessions of the ENDO-Majority treatment and the three sessions of the EXO 
treatment.
25
 We use round 1 contribution behaviors in the analysis to have high statistical power. 
In the rest of Section 5, without stating otherwise, the average cooperation behaviors of 
individual subjects, sessions or treatments are calculated based on the first round of each 
supergame. Table 6 reports the average contributions and beliefs in the ENDO-Majority 
treatment. Along with Table 2, it indicates that the average contributions with the “all rounds” 
option in the ENDO-Majority treatment are 35.7%, 30.4%, 25.4%, 36.6%, and 34.8% higher 
than those in the EXO treatment in the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 5
th
 supergames, respectively. As 
shown in Appendix Table D.2, the difference in the average contribution between the two 
treatments is significant, regardless of which empirical strategy (a) or (b) is used.
26
  
The strong impact of democratic decision-making is not due to selection bias. We 
performed a robustness check for the results shown in Panel (a) of Table 6 and Appendix Table 
D.2, considering possible selection effects (e.g., Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman 2010, Dal Bó, 
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 The period-by-period trend of average contributions by session can be found in Appendix Figure D.1. 
26
 Analyses in Appendix Table D.2 are based on the regressions as we performed in Table 3 for the ENDO treatment. 
The differences are significant also when Mann-Whitney tests are used. First, the difference in the average 
contribution under the “all rounds” option is significantly different between the ENDO-Majority and EXO treatment 
in the first supergame (two-sided p-value = .0126 if group-average data is used; two-sided p-value = .0495 if 
session-average data is used). Second, the difference is significant also when the All SG data is used (two-sided p-
value = .0495 using session-average data).  
24 
 
Foster and Kamei 2015, Kamei 2016a, Tyran and Feld 2006). Specifically, as in Section 4.2, 
assuming that groups that collectively selected the “one round” option in the ENDO-Majority 
treatment are the least cooperative groups, we drop the same number of groups with the smallest 
contributions from the EXO treatment. As detailed in Appendix Table D.3, the result of the 
positive impact of democratic decision-making is little affected by the omission of the least 
cooperative group(s) in each supergame from the EXO treatment. 
A driver of the strong contribution behavior in the ENDO-Majority treatment is the 
impact of democratic decision-making on subjects’ beliefs, as is the case for unanimity voting. 
Panel (b) of Table 6 indicates that the average beliefs with the “all rounds” option in the ENDO-
Majority treatment is always higher, compared with those in the EXO treatment in Table 4. As 
shown in Appendix Table D.2 and Table D3, once the subjects’ beliefs are controlled for, the 
difference in the subjects’ average contribution behaviors is no longer significant between the 
ENDO-Majority and EXO treatments. This implies that the function of majority voting through 
which subjects can send signals to their peers is indeed effective in enhancing cooperation (e.g., 
Tyran and Feld 2006). 
RESULT 6: Democratic decision-making enhanced both subjects’ contribution amounts and 
beliefs when the majority rule was used, as is the case when unanimity rule was used. 
In Section 4.4, we found that the impact of democratic decision-making depends on the 
agreement process (Result 4). The data of the ENDO-Majority treatment shows similar results. 
Figure 2 reports the average contribution and belief with the “all rounds” option by the number 
of voters that supported the “all rounds” option. It indicates that the higher percentage of support 
a group have for implementing the “all rounds” option, the higher average contribution they 
achieve. Especially, when all four members support the partner matching option, the average 
contributions are 58.6% and 60.3% higher than those in the EXO treatment in the 1
st
 SG data and 
All SG data, respectively (Figure 2). However, the differences in the average contribution 
between the two treatments drastically shrink when not all members vote for the “all rounds” 
option. Subjects’ beliefs, reported in Panel (b) of Figure 2, are parallel to the results of 
contribution behaviors. These results resonate with the idea that signals sent through voting 
drives the higher cooperation behavior also in the ENDO-Majority treatment.  
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Lastly, an exploration of contribution behavior with the “all rounds” option by voter type 
shows correlations between their votes and subsequent contribution behaviors. Panel (a) of Table 
6 includes the average contribution by those who voted for the “all rounds” option (the “yes 
voters,” hereafter) and those who voted against it (the “no voters,” hereafter). It indicates the 
average contribution amount of the yes voters is 79.5% higher than that of the no voters in the 1
st
 
supergame. The difference between the two voter types diminishes in the second supergame; this 
could result from the no voters’ learning to mimic the behavior of the yes voters. But, the 
average contribution of the yes voters is higher than that of the no voters in each supergame after 
the second supergame. Regression analyses, shown in Appendix Table D.7, found that the 
average contribution of the yes voters is significantly stronger than that of the no voters, whether 
the 1
st
 SG data or the All SG data is used. The trend of average beliefs (Panel (b), Table 6) is 
similar to that of average contributions. Once subjects’ beliefs are controlled for, the impact of 
democratic decision-making diminishes to a large degree (even-numbered columns in Appendix 
Table D.7). This implies that the important channel that boosts contributions in the additional 
experiment was the yes voters’ enhanced beliefs on the contribution behavior of their interaction 
partners with the “all rounds” option. 
RESULT 7: The higher percentage of support a group had when implementing the “all rounds” 
option, the higher contribution situation the group achieved in the ENDO-Majority treatment. 
RESULT 8: The yes voters contributed significantly more than the no voters when the “all 
rounds” option was implemented in the ENDO-Majority treatment. 
6. Conclusions 
 This paper explored whether people collectively prefer to play with each other in a 
partner matching or random matching environment and whether a collective choice to interact 
with the same players may mitigate subjects’ uncooperative behavior. Our experiment, whose 
framework is a linear public goods game, provides affirmative answers to both of the questions. 
First, most groups selected an option under which the members indefinitely played with each 
other under the partner matching protocol. Second, subjects’ level of contributions was 
significantly higher when they decided to repeatedly interact with each other by votes than when 
26 
 
they were given the same rule exogenously. Our analyses indicated that the impact of democratic 
decision-making is not due to selection bias, but could be due to signaling effects in the 
collective decision process: the voting process enhances the subjects’ beliefs on their peers’ 
contribution acts. The importance of democratic decision-making on behavior is similar to recent 
findings in the experimental literature (e.g. Tyran and Feld 2006, Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman 
2010, Sutter, Haigner and Kocher 2010), and is the first demonstration in the context of 
indefinitely-repeated situations. 
 Further, we conducted an additional treatment with majority voting rule to check the 
robustness of the findings based on the unanimity rule. The additional data replicates 
qualitatively almost the same results when the majority rule is used. This implies that our results 
can be robust to democratic decision rules. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there are many 
other forms of democracy, such as super-majority rule and plurality rule, and thus robustness 
check of our findings using other voting rules could be useful. 
As a final remark, we note that our paper also has a broad implication for experimental 
research on infinitely-repeated dilemma games. Experimental work to explore a possibility of 
cooperation is usually designed so that the basic rules of a game, such as continuation probability 
and matching protocols, are pre-determined without having endogenous features. This paper 
shows that letting subjects collectively select to play with the same players under the shadow of 
the future may enhance people’s contribution behavior significantly in indefinitely-repeated 
collective action dilemmas. This implies that people’s behavior and equilibrium selection may be 
largely affected by the way in which the basic rules of game are given (endogenously versus 
exogenously). 
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Figure 1: Experimental Design 
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Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
 
          
Treatment  
name 
Grouping 
(Matching  
Protocol) 
 
The way in 
which grouping 
is decided in a 
group 
The number of groups that selected  
“all rounds” option1 
 
   1
st
 SG       2
nd
 SG     3
rd
 SG      4
th
 SG       5
th
 SG 
The # of  
subjects 
(sessions) 
          
          
[Main treatments]        
ENDO  
(Endogenous) 
Partner or 
Random 
Unanimity 
Voting  
15  
[16] 
15  
[16] 
11 
[16] 
14 
[16] 
15  
[16] 
64  
(3) 
EXO 
(Exogenous) 
Partner 
Always 
partner 
matching 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
68 
(3) 
[Additional treatment] 
       
ENDO-
Majority 
(Endogenous, 
Majority rule)2 
Partner or 
Random 
Majority 
Voting 
15 
[16] 
13 
[16] 
13 
[16] 
10 
[16] 
12 
[16] 
64 
(3) 
Total   
    
 
196 
(9) 
 
 
Notes: 
1 
The numbers in the squared brackets indicate the total numbers of groups. We use the term SG as the 
abbreviation of supergame.  
2  
The ENDO-Majority treatment is an additional treatment to supplement the findings obtained in the main 
treatments. See Section 5 for the description of the ENDO-Majority treatment. 
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Table 2: Contribution Amounts in Each Supergame 
 
 Supergame 1 Supergame 2 Supergame 3 Supergame 4 Supergame 5 All Supergames 
      
(a) The ENDO treatment      
Session 1      
All rounds option 10.96 (6) 9.95 (5) 8.67 (3) 6.67 (6) 5.96 (6) 8.36 
One round option N/A (0) 4.75 (1) 5.50 (3) N/A (0) N/A (0) 5.31 
       
Session 2       
All rounds option 11.19 (4) 11.35 (5) 10.00 (5) 8.94 (4) 9.85 (5) 10.28 
One round option 0.25 (1) N/A (0) N/A (0) 0.50 (1) N/A (0) 0.38 
       
Session 3       
All rounds option 10.80 (5) 9.45 (5) 6.08 (3) 8.25 (4) 9.50 (4) 9.07 
One round option N/A (0) N/A (0) 2.75 (2) 2.00 (1) 0.75 (1) 2.06 
       
Average       
All rounds option 10.97 (15) 10.25 (15) 8.57 (11) 7.77 (14) 8.20 (15) 9.20 
One round option 0.25 (1) 4.75 (1) 4.40 (5) 1.25 (2) 0.75 (1) 3.03 
       
(b) The EXO treatment       
Session 4      
All rounds option 8.29 8.42 7.54 7.96 6.67 7.78 
       
Session 5       
All rounds option 9.58 6.83 6.42 5.67 6.17 6.93 
       
Session 6       
All rounds option 9.80 9.50 8.10 6.80 7.55 8.35 
       
Average       
All rounds option 9.19 8.18 7.31 6.81 6.75 7.65 
       
 
Notes: Each session consists of five or six groups. The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of groups that operated in the regime in the first column of the 
corresponding row as a result of voting outcomes.  The average contributions were calculated using subjects’ round 1 behavior in each supergame and session. 
The trends of contribution amounts after the first round of each supergame are found in Appendix Figure C.1.   
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Table 3: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making on Enhancing Cooperation  
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amount of subject i in round 1 of a given supergame 
 
 
     
Data: 1
st
 Supergame All Supergames 1
st
 Supergame All Supergames 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(i) Endo Dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO treatment; 0 
otherwise} 
2.42*** 
(.78) 
3.13*** 
(1.15) 
1.85 
(3.29) 
-.082 
(1.51) 
     
(ii) Supergame Number  
--- 
-0.90*** 
--- 
.077 
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (.14) (.084) 
     
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.41 
(.49) 
--- 
-.075 
(.36) 
     
(iii) Subject i’s belief on her  --- --- 1.19*** .98*** 
peers’ avg. contribution   (.30) (.15) 
     
Interaction term:  
(i)  (iii) 
--- --- 
-.075 
(.34) 
.19 
(.16) 
     
Constant 9.46*** 
(.74) 
9.77*** 
(.44) 
-2.22 
(2.97) 
-.88 
(1.62) 
     
# of observations 128 620 128 620 
Log likelihood  -356.1 -1702.6 -329.2 -1635.0 
  F  9.67 16.57 25.84 261.03 
Prob > F .0023 .0000 .0000 .0000 
     
 
 
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Observations only in groups that 
operated under the “all rounds” option in each supergame are used. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
The numbers of left-(right-)censored observations are 16(29) in columns (1) and (3) and 129(100) in columns (2) 
and (4).  
   As a robustness check, we also conducted individual random-effects ordered probit regressions with standard 
errors clustered by session ID. The results, included in Appendix Table C.2, are qualitatively similar to Table 3. We 
also note that individual random-effects linear regression with standard errors clustered by session ID also generate 
qualitatively similar results (the results are omitted to conserve space). 
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Beliefs on Matched Partners’ Average Contribution Amounts in Each Supergame 
 
 1
st
 Supergame 2
nd
 Supergame 3
rd
 Supergame 4
th
 Supergame 5
th
 Supergame All Supergames 
      
(a) The ENDO treatment      
Session 1      
All rounds option 11.63 (6) 11.10 (5) 7.58 (3) 6.92 (6) 6.83 (6) 8.87 
One round option N/A (0) 7.75 (1) 4.58 (3) N/A (0) N/A (0) 5.38 
       
Session 2       
All rounds option 10.25 (4) 8.40 (5) 7.10 (5) 6.00 (4) 6.50 (5) 7.61 
One round option 3.25 (1) N/A (0) N/A (0) 0.75 (1) N/A (0) 2.00 
       
Session 3       
All rounds option 11.15 (5) 10.90 (5) 7.75 (3) 7.44 (4) 7.44 (4) 9.10 
One round option N/A (0) N/A (0) 8.125 (2) 2.75 (1) 2.75 (1) 5.44 
       
Average       
All rounds option 11.10 (15) 10.13 (15) 7.41 (11) 6.80 (14) 6.88 (15) 8.57 
One round option 3.25 (1) 7.75 (1) 6.00 (5) 1.75 (2) 2.75 (1) 4.34 
       
(b) The EXO treatment       
Session 4      
All rounds option 9.63 9.67 8.04 6.67 7.29 8.26 
       
Session 5       
All rounds option 8.83 8.17 7.67 4.46 4.58 6.74 
       
Session 6       
All rounds option 11.10 9.40 8.35 8.50 6.60 8.79 
       
Average       
All rounds option 9.78 9.06 8.00 6.43 6.13 7.88 
       
 
Notes: Each session consists of five or six groups. The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of groups that operated in the regime in the first column of the 
corresponding row as a result of voting outcomes.  
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Table 5: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making on the Formation of Subjects’ Beliefs  
 
Dependent variable: Belief of subject i on his or her three interaction partners’ average 
contribution amount in a given supergame 
 
 
 
   
Data: 1
st
 supergame All Supergames 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) 
   
   
(i) Endo Dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO treatment; 0 otherwise} 
1.61** 
(.74) 
1.40*  
(.77) 
   
(ii) Supergame Number 
--- 
-1.03*** 
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (.14) 
   
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.24 
(.17) 
   
Constant 9.85***  
(.66) 
11.0*** 
(.37) 
   
# of observations 128 620 
Log Pseudo likelihood  -373.5 -1764.6 
F 4.77 248.9 
Prob > F .0309 .0000 
   
 
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. The numbers of left-(right-) censored 
observations are 4(14) and 22(23) in columns (1) and (2), respectively. As for the ENDO treatment, only 
observations in groups which selected the “all rounds” option are used. The numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors.  
    As a robustness check, we also conducted individual random-effects ordered probit regressions with standard 
errors clustered by session ID. The Endo Dummy in the specification of column (1) obtains a significantly positive 
coefficient as in Table 5. The Endo Dummy in the specification of column (2) obtains a positive, but insignificant, 
coefficient in the ordered probit regression. The results are included in Appendix Table C.5. 
    We also conducted individual random-effects linear regression with standard errors clustered by session ID also; 
which generates qualitatively similar results to Appendix Table C.5 (the results are omitted to conserve space). 
    *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Table 6: Contribution Amounts and Beliefs in the ENDO-Majority Treatment 
 
 
(a) Average Contribution Amounts 
 
 Supergame 1 Supergame 2 Supergame 3 Supergame 4 Supergame 5 All Supergames 
      
Additional Session 1      
 All rounds option 12.44 (4) 9.44 (4) 6.83 (3) 6.42 (3) 7.00 (3) 8.72 
 One round option 9.00 (1) 3.25 (1) 5.88 (2) 11.25 (2) 6.00 (2) 7.31 
       
Additional Session 2       
 All rounds option 11.50 (5) 11.25 (4) 9.06 (4) 12.17 (3) 10.31 (4) 10.83 
 One round option n.a. (0) 7.75 (1) 4.75 (1) 4.75 (2) 1.25 (1) 4.65 
       
Additional Session 3       
 All rounds option 13.29 (6) 11.20 (5) 10.42 (6) 9.31 (4) 9.40 (5) 10.87 
 One round option n.a. (0) 6.50 (1) n.a. (0) 8.75 (2) 5.00 (1) 7.25 
       
Average       
 All rounds option 12.47 (15) 10.67 (13) 9.17 (13) 9.30 (10) 9.10 (12) 10.27 
   Those who voted for “all rounds” option 13.25 10.24 9.73 10.28 9.77 10.83 
   Those who voted for “one round” option 7.38 11.86 7.33 5.38 6.22 8.08 
 One round option 9.00 (1) 5.83 (3) 5.50 (3) 8.25 (6) 4.56 (4) 6.51 
   Those who voted for “all rounds” option 10.00 7.20 2.00 8.10 3.13 5.73 
   Those who voted for “one round” option 8.00 4.86 8.00 8.36 6.00 7.13 
       
 
Notes: Each session consists of five or six groups. The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of groups that operated in the regime in the first column of the 
corresponding row as a result of voting outcomes.  The average contributions were calculated using subjects’ round 1 behavior in each supergame and session. 
See Part (b) of Table 2 for the average contribution amounts in the EXO treatment to see the difference between the ENDO-Majority and EXO treatments. 
Appendix Tables D.2 and D.3 show statistical significance of the impact of democratic decision-making on subjects’ contribution behavior when majority rule is 
used. 
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(b) Average Beliefs  
 
 
 Supergame 1 Supergame 2 Supergame 3 Supergame 4 Supergame 5 All Supergames 
      
Additional Session 1      
 All rounds option 10.00 (4) 8.44 (4) 8.33 (3) 6.83 (3) 7.58 (3) 8.35 
 One round option 5.00 (1) 7.25 (1)  4.63 (2)  9.38 (2)  5.88 (2) 6.50 
       
Additional Session 2       
 All rounds option 11.65 (5) 10.88 (4) 10.13 (4) 8.58 (3) 10.88 (4) 10.58 
 One round option n.a. (0)  8.25 (1)  5.00 (1)  6.88 (2)  2.50 (1) 5.90 
       
Additional Session 3       
 All rounds option 13.42 (6) 12.1 (5) 9.92 (6) 8.25 (4) 6.50 (5) 10.23 
 One round option n.a. (0) 5.25 (1) n.a. (0) 7.25 (2) 8.75 (1) 7.13 
       
Average       
 All rounds option 11.72 (15) 10.30 (13) 9.47 (13) 8.36 (10) 8.27 (12) 9.67 
   Those who voted for “all rounds” option 12.65 10.55 10.15 8.78 8.69 10.37 
   Those who voted for “one round” option 7.13 10.71 7.83 4.50 6.22 7.71 
 One round option 6.00 (1) 7.40 (3) 6.30 (3) 6.39 (6) 6.50 (4) 6.47 
   Those who voted for “all rounds” option 2.50 6.20 2.00 8.00 5.00 5.53 
   Those who voted for “one round” option 7.50 7.43 6.71 7.71 6.50 7.21 
       
 
 
Notes: Each session consists of five or six groups. The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of groups that operated in the regime in the first column of the 
corresponding row as a result of voting outcomes. See Part (b) of Table 4 for the average beliefs in the EXO treatment to see the difference between the ENDO-
Majority and EXO treatments. Appendix Table D.4 shows statistical significance of the impact of democratic decision-making on subjects’ beliefs in the first 
supergame when majority rule is used. 
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Figure 2: Average Contributions and Beliefs in the “All Rounds” Option in the ENDO-Majority 
Treatment by the Number of Supporters. 
 
 
(a) Average contributions by the number of supporters
#1
 
 
 
(b) Average beliefs on peers’ contribution amounts by the number of supporters 
 
Notes: 𝑐𝐸𝑋𝑂1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average round 1 contribution (average belief) in the first supergame in the EXO treatment in 
graph (a) (graph (b)). 𝑐𝐸𝑋𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the average round 1 contribution (average belief) in all supergames in the EXO 
treatment in graph (a) (graph (b)). 
#1 
There are zero cases where the number of support was two and the computer 
randomly implement the “all rounds” option in the first supergame.  
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Appendix B: Theoretical Consideration for Groups that Collectively Select the “One round” 
Option in the ENDO treatment 
In this part of the Appendix, we first show that the mutual full contribution situation 
holds as an equilibrium outcome (Section B.1). We then illustrate that there also exists a 
symmetric, positive less-than-full-contribution equilibrium for any contribution level ξ ∈ {1, 2, 
…, 19} (Section B.2). 
B.1. Mutual Full Contribution Equilibrium 
In order to illustrate that there are no incentives to deviate from the mutual full 
contribution situation, we consider a very extreme case in which all groups in a session, six 
groups, selected the “one round” option in the ENDO treatment and all subjects that are in these 
groups have contributed full endowment amount (E) so far (before round t) in a given round. We 
also suppose that subjects have acted on a grim trigger strategy until this round. We show that 
even in this situation subject i decides not to defect. This suggests that the mutual full 
contribution equilibrium exists for every possible situation as to the number of groups that 
selected the “one round” option (∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}). This is because the more groups select the 
“one round” option in a given supergame, the higher the incentive for a subject i to deviate in 
that supergame is because i can more easily engage in the hit-and-run strategy (defect and then 
escape from the group members) if more groups select the “one round” option.  
Suppose that the subject i’s three peers and all subjects in other groups that selected the 
“one round” option continue to choose the grim trigger strategy in round t and onward in a given 
supergame. 
If subject i also continues to act on the grim trigger strategy until the given supergame is 
over, she would obtain the following expected payoff for the rest of rounds: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖] = ∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡)
∞
𝑠=𝑡 =
𝑟∙𝑁∙𝐸
1−𝛿
= 128, (B1) 
where δ = .75, r = .4, N = 4 and E = 20. 
Step 1: There are no incentives for subject i to contribute 0 points in round t and then return to 
full contribution in round t + 1 
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Suppose that i contributes 0 points in round t but returns to full contribution in round t + 
1. In this scenario, subject i obtains E – 0 + r∙(N – 1)∙E = 44 points in round t. The expected 
payoff of subject i in round t + 1 is computed as: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1] = 32 ∙
(203 )(
3
0)
(233 )
+ 24 ∙
(202 )(
3
1)
(233 )
+ 16 ∙
(201 )(
3
2)
(233 )
+ 8 ∙
(200 )(
3
3)
(233 )
≈ 28.8696. (B2) 
After round t + 1, any subject that encounters at least one 0-contributor in round t, round t + 1 or 
later rounds also becomes a 0-contributor. The three peers of subject i in round t are 0-
contributors in round t + 2 with a probability of 100%. The probability that a subject j in a group 
to which subject i’s did not belong in round t does not become a 0-contributor in round t + 2 is 
calculated as: 
𝑝 ≡
(203 )(
3
0)
(233 )
=
1140
1771
≈ 64.37%, 
because the number of full contributors except j in round t + 1 is 20. Here, we claim that the 
probability that j remains to be a full contributor in round t + 3 (p’) is less than 12%, regardless 
of i’s action choices in round t + 2 as below: 
Claim: p’ < .12.  
When i contributed E points in round t + 2,  
𝑝′ ≡ 𝑝 ∙
𝑝3(193 )(
3
0)+1∙𝑝
2(192 )(
3
0)
(233 )
= .1197 < .12. 
When i contributed 0 points in round t + 2, 
𝑝′ ≡ 𝑝 ∙
𝑝3(193 )(
3
0)
(233 )
= .0939 < .12. 
This calculation indicates that p’ < .12. ■ 
 
Subject i would obtain the largest per-round payoff in round t + 2 when i contributes 0 points in 
round t + 2: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+2]|𝑐𝑖,𝑡+2=0
= 20 + 8 ∙ [(3𝑝3 + 2𝑝2(1 − 𝑝) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)2) ∙
(203 )(
3
0)
(233 )
+ (2𝑝2 + 𝑝(1 −
𝑝))
(202 )(
3
1)
(233 )
+ 𝑝 ∙
(201 )(
3
2)
(233 )
],   (B3) 
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which equals 28.961. 
The per-round expected payoff that subject i obtains after round t + 2 is less than round t 
+ 3 expected payoff when i contributed 0 points while assuming p’ = .12, whose payoff is equal 
to around 21.014 (this value is obtained by evaluating Eq. (B3) by substituting p = .12). Thus, we 
have the following inequality for i’s after round t + 2: 
𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡+3 ] ≪
𝛿3
1−𝛿
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+3] < max
𝛿3
1−𝛿
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+3] <
(.75)3∙21.014
1−.75
≈ 35.46. 
Therefore,  
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖] = 𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡 ] ≪ 44 + 𝛿 ∙ 28.87 + 𝛿
2 ∙ 28.96 + 35.46 = 117.4, (B4) 
which is lower than the sum of total expected payoffs under the mutual full contribution situation 
calculated in Eq. (B1). This means that contributing 0 points in round t and then returning to full 
contribution in round t + 1 is not the best response for subject i. 
Step 2: There are no incentives for subject i to contribute 0 points in both round t and round t + 1 
 Suppose that subject i contributes 0 points in round t + 1, in addition to round t. Then, the 
expected payoff of subject i in round t + 1 is computed as: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1] = 20 + [24 ∙
(203 )(
3
0)
(233 )
+ 16 ∙
(202 )(
3
1)
(233 )
+ 8 ∙
(201 )(
3
2)
(233 )
] ≈ 40.8696. (B5) 
The probability that a subject j in a group to which subject i did not belong in round t does not 
become a 0-contributor in round t + 2 is: 
𝑞 =
(193 )(
3
0)
(233 )
=
969
1771
= 54.71% < 54.75%, 
because the number of full contributors other than j in round t + 1 is 19. Thus, subject i’s 
expected payoff in round t + 2 is less than or equal to the value of Eq. (B3) evaluated at p = q = 
.5475: i.e., 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+2] < 26.84.  
Here, we claim that the probability that j remains to be a full contributor in round t + 3 
(q’) is less than 6.49%, regardless of i’s action choice in round t + 2. 
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Claim: q’ < .0649. 
When i contributed E points in round t + 2, 
𝑞′ ≡ 𝑞 ∙
𝑞3(193 )(
3
0)+𝑞
2(192 )(
3
0)
(233 )
= .06485 < .0649. 
When i contributed 0 points in round t + 2, 
𝑞′ ≡ 𝑞 ∙
𝑞3(193 )(
3
0)
(233 )
= .049 < .05. 
This calculation indicates that q’ < .0649. ■ 
 
The per-round expected payoff that subject i obtains after round t + 2 is less than her round t + 3 
expected payoff when i contributed 0 points in round t + 3 while assuming q’ = .0649, whose 
payoff is equal to around 20.53 (this value is obtained by evaluating Eq. (B3) by substituting p = 
q’ = .0649). Thus, we have the following inequality for i’s payoffs after round t + 2: 
𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡+3 ] ≪
𝛿3
1−𝛿
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+3] <
(.75)3∙20.53 
1−.75
≈ 34.65. 
In other words, we obtain the following strict inequality: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖] = 𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡 ] ≪ 44 + 𝛿 ∙ 40.87 + 𝛿
2 ∙ 26.84 + 34.65 ≈ 124.40. (B6) 
This expected payoff (left-hand side) is lower than the sum of expected payoffs in the mutual full 
contribution situation calculated in Eq. (B1). This means that contributing 0 points in both 
rounds t and t + 1 is not a materially beneficial deviation for subject i. 
 
The Steps 1 and 2 suggest that the mutual full contribution situation holds as an equilibrium 
outcome. 
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B.2. Symmetric, Positive, but Less-than-full-Contribution Equilibrium 
Similar calculations as in Section B.1 show that there also exists a symmetric, positive, 
but less-than-full-contribution equilibrium for each contribution level ξ ∈ {1, 2, …, 19}. The 
following table indicates the summary of the calculations. For each level ξ, we considered the 
two cases (Step 1 and Step 2) as in Section B.1. 
  
ξ Total expected payoff from 
symmetric, positive 
contribution equilibrium with 
the level of ξ points (= E + 
(rN – 1)ξ/(1 –δ)) 
The supremum of the expected payoff 
when i contributes 0 in round t and 
then returns to contribute ξ points in 
round t + 1 (Eq.(4), included in step 1 
above, calculated for each ξ points) 
The supremum of the expected 
payoff when i contributes 0 in both 
rounds t and t + 1 (Eq.(6), in step 2 
above, calculated for each ξ points) 
1 82.4 81.9 82.2  
2 84.8 83.7 84.4  
3 87.2 85.6 86.7  
4 89.6 87.5 88.9  
5 92.0 89.4 91.1  
6 94.4 91.2 93.3  
7 96.8 93.1 95.5  
8 99.2 95.0 97.8  
9 101.6 96.8 100.0  
10 104.0 98.7 102.2  
11 106.4 100.6 104.4  
12 108.8 102.4 106.6  
13 111.2 104.3 108.9  
14 113.6 106.2 111.1  
15 116.0 107.3 113.3  
16 118.4 109.9 115.5  
17 120.8 111.8 117.7  
18 123.2 113.7 112.0  
19 125.6 115.5 122.2  
20 128.0
#1
 117.4
#2
 124.4  
 
Notes: 
#1
 This is the case of the full contribution equilibrium (see Section B.1 for the details). The payoff was 
calculated with Eq. (B1). 
#2 
This was calculated with Eq. (B4). 
 
This table indicates that deviating from contributing ξ points is not materially beneficial for each 
subject, assuming that all of their peers are employing the grim trigger strategy in that they 
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contribute ξ points until they observe that at least one of peers contribute less than ξ points; and 
once they see such defection they begin to contribute 0 points until the end of a given supergame.
 
